ги ги . а що - він лічно все до останнього гвінтіка розробляв ? а тисячі німецьких вчених і цілі заводи хто в сраний савок вивозив ?
на - почитай . тут цікавіше . і не будь таким тупим як рюцкє мудаки , які до цього часу тупу срану савкову пропаганду розкидують разом з гівном рюцкє гівноміра
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In October 1946, the best German engineers who worked for the Soviet missile program were ordered on the trains and sent to the various locations in the USSR to assist in the organization of missile production and design. By the beginning of the 1947, Soviets completed the transfer of all works on rocket technology from Germany into secret locations in the USSR. In the fall of 1947, Soviet-German team launched eleven A-4 rockets near the village of Kapustin Yar in the steppes north of the Caspian Sea.
End of a honeymoon
Given a pathological obsession of the Soviet government with secrecy, it was a remarkable phenomenon that Joseph Stalin did allow hundreds of Soviet specialists, many of them recent GULAG inmates, travel to postwar Germany and work side by side with their German colleagues on the development of rocket technology. Inevitably, the whole endeavor had a temporary nature, aimed to train Soviet cadre in the industry that was virtually nonexistent in the USSR at the time. From the outset of the program, Soviet authorities had grave concerns about engaging thousands of Germans, who had relative freedom of movement, into the sensitive defense project.
On May 7, 1946, Ivan Serov, the head of the Soviet security policy, NKVD, in Germany received a letter from A. G. Mrykin from the artillery directorate, GAU, complaining about overwhelming number of Germans involved in the Soviet rocket development effort. The document stressed that German specialists not only were gaining experience in the production of the current German technology, but also had direct access to the Soviet efforts to develop follow-on rocket systems. (170)
Along with having their rocket program exposed to Western intelligence, the USSR was now restoring military-industrial potential of Germany, something the Soviet government was least interested to do. Not to mention, Soviet authorities were concerned they would be accused by the allies of noncompliance with Allied Control Council agreements on the liquidation of the German war machine, which could lead to demands by the allies for inspections. (172)
Official decisions on the deportation of Germans
On April 17, 1946, the Soviet of Ministers USSR issued a decree No. 874-366ss ordering Ministry of Aviation Industry, MAP, to deport 1,400 German engineers and workers in the USSR. Including family members, the number of deported was expected to reach 3,500 people at that point.
On August 24, 1946, Colonel General Ivan Serov, a secret police officer who served as a Deputy Commander of the Soviet Administration in Germany, SVAG, sent a letter to Georgy Malenkov, a top party official overseeing rocketry, asking for government decision on the deportation of German specialists in the USSR. A draft of the government decree on the issue reviewed by the SVAG commander V. D. Sokolovsky and leaders of the various industries was conveniently attached to the letter. Among the officials who read the draft were Dmitry Ustinov, the head of Ministry of Armaments, assigned to host the rocket program; Mikhail Khrunichev, the head of Ministry of Aviation Industry, Ustinov's deputy Ivan Zubovich and Soviet representatives in Germany responsible for reactive and radar technology N. E. Nosovsky and M. M. Lukin.
To minimize the attempts of escape, Soviet authorities scheduled deportations to take place simultaneously across the Soviet zone and in the shortest possible period of time between 15th and 20th of October 1946. The head of Soviet secret police in Germany Ivan Serov would personally lead the operation. Major General A. M. Sidnev, the chief of operations department of the Internal Affairs Ministry, MVD, in Berlin was delegated responsibilities for the logistical support.
The commander of SVAG Sokolovsky supplied troops, tracks, railroad cars, fuel and food rations. Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov provided guard units for the trains.
In the recent past, Serov's chief Lavrenty Beriya had already accumulated a "considerable experience" in forced deportations of entire national minorities in the USSR, which were deemed to be a threat to the Soviet regime.
On September 13, 1946, Soviet of Ministers USSR issued decree No. 2163-880s entitled"On removal of hardware from the German military enterprises." The document officially launched the process of transfer of German rocket production potential to the USSR.
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